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Today embodiment is a critical theme in several branches of the contemporary philosophical 
debate. The term embodiment refers to the role of an agent’s own body in his situated life, 
suggesting the existence of a bodily root for several experiential and cognitive abilities. A 
metaphor, that of the root, which aims at establishing a constitutive participation of the body in 
what we usually consider the domain of the mind. As other philosophical concepts, the notion 
of embodiment, as well as the idea of embodied mind, lacks of an explicit and shared definition, 
therefore, is possible to find many different uses of it. Works concerning “embodiment” cover 
many fields of research such as those concerning the nature of abstract thought (Lakoff & 
Núñez 2000), artificial intelligence (Clark 1998) and social cognition (Sinigaglia 2009). The aim of 
this paper is to define a path linking considerations from the phenomenological tradition with 
recent theoretical developments and experimental evidence. This will make it possible to show 
that the identification of the bodily roots of experience has the consequence to involve a series of 
theoretical and experimental consequences leading towards an enactive and ecological approach 
to perception. 
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For the phenomenological debate, the notion of embodiment coincides with the 
rebuttal of what is usually considered the Cartesian dualism. In spite of the fact 
that Descartes’ ontological distinction is traditionally considered to be the 
origin of the dualistic stance in philosophy of mind, it should be noted that 
the French philosopher also considered the problem posed by the interaction 
of what he called res extensa and res cogitans. In a famous passage of his Sixth 
Meditation, Descartes rejects the idea that our bodily dimension and our 
mental dimension can be described as two independent things:
“Nature also teaches me, by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst and so 
on, that I’m not merely present in my body as a sailor in a ship, but I’m very 
closely joined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so that I and the body 
form a unity.” (Descartes 1986, p. 56) 
However, the fact that perceptions and sensations reveal that our subjective 
experiences and body form a unity is, exactly, what a dualistic stance is not 
capable to explain. 
After Descartes, the way to understand the relationship between body 
and consciousness finds a new style in the nineteenth century with the 
establishment of the framework of phenomenology. The role of the body 
in shaping human experience emerges as a critical background assumption 
within several parts of Husserl’s thought. The constitutive function of the 
body turns out to be relevant for Husserl starting from the early lectures 
of 1907 (Husserl 1997). In this work, particularly in section 3, Husserl’s 
analysis of perception is concerned with the perspectival appearance of 
every perceived object due to the spatial location of the perceiver, so that 
the noematic constitution of the perceptive referents can only be defined 
moving from the assumption of an embodied subject (for a more detailed 
analysis, see also Zahavi 1994). Certainly, the most critical Husserl’s work 
concerning embodiment is the second volume of the Ideas. Exploiting the 
possibilities allowed by the analytical character of the German language, 
Husserl suggests that intrinsic qualities characterizing our bodily experience 
could be expressed using two different conceptual frameworks: as a physical 
object (der Körper) and as a lived phenomenon (der Lieb). According to this view, 
embodiment is not a concept pertaining to the experience of an autonomous 
physical thing (der Körper); rather it pertains to the first person experiential 
domain, as well as it concerns also to the way a direct interaction with 
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the world is personally lived by the subject through his bodily-related 
phenomenological modalities (der Lieb). 
Accordingly, through the introduction of kinesthetic constraints, relating the 
sense of bodily position, weight, movement of the muscles and joints with 
the appearance and the variation of conscious phenomena, the body becomes 
the medium of all possible object-directed perception (Husserl 1989, p. 61). 
As the bearer of the zero point of orientation, each thing that appears, or is 
supposed to be able to appear, has eo ipso an orienting relation to the body 
and its kinesthetic functions (Giorello & Sinigaglia 2007). According to Husserl 
(1970), if the self is originally embodied, the relationships and the interaction 
with the surrounding environment assume the role of critical condition for 
the possibility of any subjective lived experience. The role of the body lies in 
the assumption that an un-thematic “being-in a life-world” functions as the 
condition of possibility for all phenomena; so that the presence of a system 
constituted by corporeal features and kinesthetic dynamics emerges as the 
transcendental condition of all possible objective experiences. This leads Husserl 
to state that, in order to be intelligible, even God, considered as a necessary 
limiting concept, must “see the things precisely through sensuous appearance” 
(Husserl 1989, p. 90), that is, through the kinesthetic regularities allowed by the 
possession of a body endowed with a specific shape and sense organs analogous 
to those of a human being. In this manner Husserl attributes a critical 
importance to human embodiment, making corporeality a critical constraint of a 
purely intellectual understanding of what he calls the life-world. 
Within the phenomenological tradition, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, more than 
Husserl, focused his attention on the role of the body in the construction 
of subjective experience. Capturing the idea of phenomenal body with the 
concept of corps propre (i.e., one’s own body), Merleau-Ponty has emphasized 
the role of the agentive character that accompany the human embodied 
nature. In his early work The structure of behavior, Merleau-Ponty states that 
the world experienced by a subject emerges from the interaction between 
states of consciousness and the environmental conditions, so the subject can 
primarily be conceived as living “in a direct commerce with beings, things 
and his proper body” (Merleau-Ponty 1983, p. 189). According to this view, 
le corps propre appears not only as a material thing, that is, a potential object 
of study for experimental sciences, but can also be considered a constitutive 
element of the perceptual world, that is, the permanent envelop shaping any 
experiential (motor) activity.
For Merleau-Ponty the body is the origin of the subjective experience of space 
and represents its necessary condition of existence so that “there would be 
no space at all” for an ideal disembodied subject (Merleau-Ponty 2002, p. 117). 
Accordingly, to conceive a space it is necessary that “we have been thrust 
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into it by our body” (p. 164), that is, that we have provided us with a first 
model of spatial features through a direct experience of movement in the 
environment. As such, he claims the body is a crucial experiential element, 
the source of several independent phenomenological constraints that affect our 
experience of external surroundings (Merleau-Ponty 2002, p. 87, 511).
According to Merleau-Ponty, conscious perception is a way through which 
one is able to interact with the environment; that is an aspect of the process 
by means of which a subject reaches his goals. The body, as a condition for 
every perceptive experience, can be compared to a sort of selective device; a 
spatial form in front of which the world shows up only through “important 
figures against indifferent backgrounds” in virtue of its being polarized 
by the tasks and the aims that characterize motor intentions and action 
execution in an ordinary existence. This leads Merleau-Ponty to argue that 
originally a conscious life is not a mere matter of an abstract and disembodied 
“I think”, but it is grounded in the ensemble of motor possibilities of one’s 
own body, that is in the “I can” that always goes with the execution of 
actions. Accordingly, the sense of agency is not the byproduct of a pure ideal 
conscious life, something that, as it were, governs the movements of one’s own 
body in function of a goal reaching. Instead, in order to perceive an object, or 
intentionally act toward it, is necessary that the target of one’s actions exists 
for his body, namely, that it belongs to the range of possibilities of action that 
pertain to the body itself. The motor experience of our own body cannot be 
considered as a mere case of knowledge, instead motor experience gives us a 
primary access to the world, representing both the condition and the limiting 
constraint of the human conscious life. 
Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s works shows that phenomenology, 
from its early stage, has conceived the body as a critical locus for the 
constitution of an objective experience. As noted by Gallagher & Zahavi 
(2008), for the phenomenological tradition the body, since it is implicated 
in the constitution of an objective phenomenal world, turns out to be a 
transcendental principle whose analysis appears of critical importance to the 
understanding of human cognitive abilities. A phenomenological analysis 
necessarily reveals that no objective experience can be conceived without 
tacitly assuming that a lived body always accompanies all possible variations 
through which phenomena inhabit our consciousness. As a result, the body 
emerges as a functional constraint that imposes its structure over different 
domains of human experience. Although Husserl’s analysis deals only with 
the recognition of a kinesthetic function of human embodiment, it should 
be noted that Merleau-Ponty has the merit to have build up this conception, 
conceiving the body not only as a mere apparatus for movements through the 
space, but also as the bearer of human intentions and actions. An intuition, 
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that of Merleau-Ponty, that makes it possible the introduction of what has 
been called the ecological theory of perception.
Focusing the attention on the major theoretical frameworks in cognitive 
science, it is interesting to note that a consideration concerning the influence 
of bodily features within the processes of perception has been developed 
mainly as a reaction to the computational conception in cognitive science 
(Dreyfus 1972). After years in which the functionalist paradigm has been the 
only game in town, the idea of an embodied dynamicism is today emerging 
with the support from substantial empirical evidence. As perceptual 
experience is shaped by action execution, it seems necessary to assume 
a more general theoretical framework within which the interconnection 
between the perceiving subject and the environment is adequately emphasized. 
This seems to be the case with some critical aspects of the ecological approach 
to perception as introduced by James Gibson (1979). It can be considered a 
gestalt theory of cognition based on numerous experimental outcomes (for 
a review, see Chemero 2009), which shows how certain aspectual values are 
directly perceived via a process of pattern recognition. Instead of adopting 
the idea that visual representations result from the hierarchical processing of 
sensory stimuli, Gibson argued that perception is already structured in ways 
that specify the layout of the environment through the perception of salient 
features so that the perceived world is always awareness of a system rich 
in meaning. Accordingly, a perceptive experience is not the final stage of a 
synthetic activity involving the unification of basic qualitative elements, but is 
an internally structured process based on the notion of affordances instead of 
that of elementary qualities. 
An affordance is an invariant combination of objective features based on 
the subject’s possibilities of action and interaction with the environment in 
accordance with his physical constitution and intentions. Gibson’s critical idea 
was that the human perceptive ability becomes tuned to such possibilities of 
action and that there is no need to invoke something like an internal neutral 
representation as an additional entity mediating between perception and action. 
On the contrary, in this view, perception emerges as an action-oriented process 
based on those features characterizing the body of an agent in its interaction 
with the environment within which an organism lives and evolves. Basically, 
this approach holds that the perception of events and things subserves not 
only internal representational functions (e.g., imagery, memory, reasoning) but 
action-related functions as well (e.g., action planning). In other words, Gibson 
ecological conception states that the interaction between action and perception 
is based on the very intuitive principle according to which we must perceive in 
order to move, as well as we must move in order to perceive. 
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According to the affordance hypothesis, the perception of some objective 
properties is related to the subject’s motor possibilities, so that the 
perception of specific features should be correlated and anticipated by 
specific behavioral reactions. As a result, in a study performed by Klatzky et 
al. (1995), authors showed how cognitive processes that eventually produce 
arm movements to interact with an object actually initiate before the contact 
with target. The authors refer to a process of advance action specification 
as a form of planning that involves reaction to direct perceptive stimuli 
in preparation for movement on the basis of parameterized components 
(such as force, precision etc.) with the aim of tuning action with objective 
characteristics. In a study performed by Craighero et al. (1999), subjects were 
asked to grasp a bar, oriented in different ways in conjunction with the 
presentation of visual stimuli that were congruent (or incongruent) with 
selected properties of the object to be grasped, such as its spatial orientation. 
Results of this series of experiments converge to show that grasping reaction 
times to congruent visual stimuli are usually faster that reaction times to 
incongruent stimuli. Data indicate that the preparation to act on an object 
facilitates the processing of perceptive stimuli that are congruent with the 
object toward which the action is direct and that the same occurs also when 
participants are suddenly instructed to inhibit a prepared movement and to 
respond with a different motor effector.
Within the field of cognitive studies, many other experimental results show 
that a relationship exists between the dynamic properties of the body and 
the environment. Among them there are the experiments performed by 
Mike Tucker and Rob Ellis (Tucker & Ellis 1998; 2001; 2004; Ellis & Tucker 
2000) whose results are consistent with the view that a seen object potentiates 
different sensory-motor parameterized components related to the action 
afforded by the same object. In addition, results support the view that 
intentions to act operate on the basis of the recognition of potential actions 
elicited by a visual scene. For example, in a study by Tucker and Ellis (1998) 
participants were invited to judge whether pictures of affordable objects 
were presented in a normal vertical orientation, or were inverted, by pressing 
either a right or left key. Even though the horizontal orientation of the object 
was irrelevant in the assigned task, when associated with the object’s proper 
affordances, this variable influenced participants’ motor acts involved in the 
execution of responses by pressing keys. In particular, if the hand of response 
was the same normally required for reaching or grasping the represented 
object, participants were faster in executing the task than in the incongruent 
case. According to these data Tipper et al. (2006) have demonstrated that 
affordance recognition is not completely automatic, but is determined by 
the action-related nature of the stimulus properties that are attended to. 
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Thus, when a person focuses his attention to the shape of an object, action 
affordance effects are observed (action compatibility effect); but when a person 
is engaged in discriminating an object’s property unrelated with any action 
possibility, such as color for example, no affordance effects are observed. 
This shows that the shape is associated with action, such as grasping; but that 
color is irrelevant to action and doesn’t afford any significant measurable 
motor activity.
Along this line of research many theoretical frameworks in cognitive 
science have recently been developed with the aim of introducing a new 
paradigm about the common underpinning of action and perception. Among 
them it must be cited The Theory of Event Coding (TEC) (Hommel, Müsseler, 
Aschersleben and Prinz, 2001) holding that the cognitive representations of 
events and objects subserve not only functions such as perception, imagery, 
memory and reasoning, but also action-related functions. TEC claims that 
the cognitive codes that represent perceptual objects are identical to those 
representing action plans in that both refer to external entities. According to 
TEC, it makes sense to assume that the representations underlying perception 
and those underlying action planning are coded together, so that it’s possible 
to assume the existence of a common representational domain for perceived 
events and intended actions. The limit of an integrated view on information 
processing such as TEC is that, even though this conception makes intelligible 
the relation between bodily interaction with the environment and perceptual 
sensitivity, it doesn’t give any genetic explanation about the existence of such 
a commonality between representations that makes it possible to link action 
and perception. 
In order to overcome difficulties such as these, it is possible to avoid the 
postulation of theoretical entities such as mental representations and 
computational processes, limiting the analysis to a description concerning 
the interaction between the subject and the environment. Perception and 
action can be understood as a factual coupling of action and environmental 
features so that in this view the perceived world emerges as a meaning-
leaden system based on the presence of affordances, that is, on perceptive 
aspects meaningful to animals because based on the recognition of practical 
action possibilities that are spread all over the environment. Within this 
approach, agents and environment are modelled as coupled dynamical 
systems forming a non-decomposable evolutionary unity whose behaviour 
cannot be modelled as a set of separate parts. This can be viewed as a co-
determination of the organism and the world where it lives in, according 
to which the body and the ecological niche where it is situated enact each 
other through their structural coupling. Given this view, it follows that the 
concept of biological evolution, instead of being a process whereby organisms 
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modify themselves to solve problems posed by an autonomous environment, 
can actually be assumed as a process through which living beings and their 
habitat preserve their coupling 1.
Assuming that our mind has an embodied character requires us to abandon 
the Cartesian view according to which the mental is a distinct dimension 
from that of the body. According to this, the phenomenological tradition 
and the ecological approaches to cognition converge on the proposition that 
subjective experiential consciousness has to be explicated in relation to the 
human embodied nature, showing a full sense of the term “embodiment” that 
encompasses static as well as dynamic corporeal features in relation with the 
environment.
It should be noted that although Husserl has recognized the role of the bodily 
possibility of movement as a pre-condition for perceptive experience, his 
view lacks of emphasizing the role of practical skills in shaping perception. 
Differently, Merleau-Ponty has focused the attention on the role of the 
agentive character that accompany human embodiment, introducing the 
constitutive role of practical skills for experience.
The phenomenological analysis of human embodiment cannot be divorced 
from the assumption of an ecological approach that makes it possible 
to emphasize adequately how the interaction between the body and the 
environment shapes the subject’s perceptual experience. The human body 
is always a situated thing whose functioning is strictly influenced by the 
character of its habitat. Movements, actions and goals ascribable to an 
embodied being are always the result of a body-environment coupling; 
accordingly it seems reasonable to expect that every perceptive experience 
of the environment will be shaped by the recognition of those salient features 
defined by goals and motor possibilities in the surrounding environment. Just 
this combination of flesh, actions and environment is the distinctive character 
of our being in the world.
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